It wasn't so long ago that the overwhelming majority of courts in democratic countries shared a reluctance to refer to foreign and international law. These courts conformed to a policy of avoiding any application of foreign sources of law that would clash with the position of their domestic governments. But as this Article demonstrates, in recent years courts in several democracies have begun to show a change of heart, often engaging quite seriously in the interpretation and application of international law and heeding the constitutional jurisprudence of other national courts. The Article explains this emerging jurisprudence as part of a reaction to the forces of globalization that are placing increasing pressure on governments, legislatures and courts to conform to global standards. The courts seek to expand the space for domestic deliberation and to strengthen the ability of national governments to withstand the pressure brought to bear by interest groups and powerful foreign governments. For this strategy to succeed, courts need to forge a united judicial front. This entails coordinating their policies with equally positioned courts in other countries, through the common language of international law and comparative constitutional law. The analysis also explains why the U.S. Supreme Court, which so far was not required to protect domestic political process from external pressures, is still not a part of this collective effort. Finally, and based on this insight into the driving force behind reliance on foreign law, the Article asserts that recourse to these sources is perfectly legitimate from a democratic theory perspective, as it aims to reclaim democracy from the debilitating grip of globalization. It wasn't so long ago that the overwhelming majority of courts in democratic countries shared a reluctance to refer to foreign and international law. These courts conformed to a policy of avoiding any application of foreign sources of law that would clash with the position of their domestic governments. But as this Article demonstrates, in recent years courts in several democracies have begun to show a change of heart, often engaging quite seriously in the interpretation and application of international law and heeding the constitutional jurisprudence of other national courts. The Article explains this emerging jurisprudence as part of a reaction to the forces of globalization that are placing increasing pressure on governments, legislatures and courts to conform to global standards. The courts seek to expand the space for domestic deliberation and to strengthen the ability of national governments to withstand the pressure brought to bear by interest groups and powerful foreign governments. For this strategy to succeed, courts need to forge a united judicial front. This entails coordinating their policies with equally positioned courts in other countries, through the common language of international law and comparative constitutional law. The analysis also explains why the U.S. Supreme Court, which so far was not required to protect domestic political process from external pressures, is still not a part of this collective effort. Finally, and based on this insight into the driving force behind reliance on foreign law, the Article asserts that recourse to these sources is perfectly legitimate from a democratic theory perspective, as it aims to reclaim democracy from the debilitating grip of globalization.
I. Introduction
It wasn't so long ago that the overwhelming majority of courts in democratic countries shared a reluctance to refer to foreign and international law. These courts conformed to a policy of avoiding any application of foreign sources of law that would clash with the position of their domestic governments. For many jurists, recourse to foreign and international law is inappropriate.
1 But even the supporters of the reference to external sources of law share the thus-unexplored assumption that reliance on foreign and international law is inevitably in tension with the value of national sovereignty. Hence the scholarly debate is framed along the lines of the wellknown broader debate on "the countermajoritarian difficulty. in what could perhaps be a globally coordinated move. This Article describes and explains this shift, arguing that the national courts' chief motivation is not to promote global justice, for they continue to regard themselves first and foremost as national agents. Rather, the new jurisprudence is part of a reaction to the forces of globalization that are placing increasing pressure on the different domestic branches of government to conform to global standards. This reaction seeks to expand the space for domestic deliberation, to strengthen the ability of national governments to withstand the pressure brought to bear by interest groups and powerful foreign governments, and to insulate the national courts from inter-governmental pressures.
For this strategy to succeed, courts need to forge a united judicial front. This entails coordinating their policies with equally positioned courts in other countries, by developing common communication tools consisting of international law and comparative constitutional law. The analysis also explains why the U.S. Supreme
Court, which does not need to protect the domestic political or judicial processes from external pressure, is still not a part of this collective effort. 3 Based on this insight into the driving force behind reliance on foreign law, the Article proposes another outlook for assessing the legitimacy of national courts' resort to foreign and international legal sources. It asserts that recourse to these sources is perfectly legitimate from a democratic theory perspective, as it aims to reclaim democracy from the debilitating grip of globalization.
Only fifteen years ago it was the common practice of national courts across the globe to avoid any application of international law that would clash with the position of their governments thereby guaranteeing them complete latitude in external affairs. 4 Through an assortment of avoidance doctrines (such as standing, the "political question," and non-justiciability), the identification or misidentification of customary international law, and expansive or restrictive interpretation of treaties, national courts managed to align their findings and judgments with the preferences of their governments. Some courts acknowledged their reticence to deviate from the government's position and explained this as deference to the executive's expertise in negotiating international relations, referring to the necessity for the state "to speak in one voice." 5 Harold Koh reminded us at the time that courts had not always been deferential. In his view, "transnational public law litigation" could and should become an effective tool for enforcing international law in the post Cold-War era. 6 My take was more pessimistic, due to the assessment that courts had more immediate, parochial concerns:
National courts are the prisoners in the classic prisoner's dilemma. If they could have been assured that courts in other jurisdictions would similarly enforce international law, they would have been more willing to cooperate.
They might have been ready to restrict their government's free hand, had they been reassured that other governments would be likewise restrained. But in the current status of international politics, such cooperation is difficult to achieve, and rational judges act like the prisoner who cannot be sure that his or her fellow prisoner will cooperate.
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The courts' acquiescence specifically in the area of external affairs implied that international law was not rejected per se: In matters having no bearing on this foreign affairs, several national courts were willing to apply international law. For example, international human rights law was particularly influential in matters of only domestic consequence. 8 National courts' reference to one another's decisions on human rights issues has proved a highly effective tool of cross-fertilization. Anne-Marie Slaughter suggested that "[c]ourts may well feel a particular common bond with one another in adjudicating human rights cases … because such cases engage a core judicial function in many countries around the world." 9 Some prominent judges actively involved in this inter-judicial dialogue on human rights issues shared this outlook. 10 Similarly, in matters of transnational civil litigation, which do not raise aspects governments are usually sensitive to, such as giving effect to foreign judgments and laws of recognized states, interpreting the liability of air carriers, according immunity to foreign states from litigation, or more recently questions of jurisdiction over internet service providers, courts have felt comfortable interacting with one another, invoking notions of inter-judicial comity.
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Fifteen years later, there are early but clear signs of courts that are venturing to take up issue with their governments even in matters that may restrict the governments' free hand in international bargaining and expose them to external pressure. National courts join forces to offer meaningful judicial review of governmental action, even inter-governmental action. In this quest to restrict executive latitude, international law looms large as a key tool alongside comparative constitutional law. In other words, references to foreign law and to international law are being transformed from the shield that protected the government from judicial review to the sword by which the government's (or governments') case is struck down. The purpose of this Article, then, is to describe this transformation and explain its underlying logic.
In this Article, I offer an explanation for the growing interaction amongst courts that claims that courts are motivated primarily by parochial, even selfish, concerns. They seek to resist globalization's threat to their own national democratic processes, and to their own recent achievements to bolster their institutional independence. 12 Hence, when no such threats exists, they will refrain from cooperating with other courts. 13 The analysis here should clarify why courts in developing countries, facing immense external pressures, frantically cling to whatever international "soft law" they can cull from international documents, while the court of the strongest global power allows itself to treat international law and comparative constitutional law with puzzlement and even disdain. This explanation offers justification for the practice of the national courts from the perspective of democratic theory: courts invoke international law not because they defer to other communities' values and interests but because they wish to protect or even reclaim the domestic political space that is increasingly restricted by the economic forces of globalization and the delegation of authority to international institutions. Under contemporary conditions, protecting domestic interests and, in particular, reclaiming the domestic democratic processes, often require that national courts forge a coordinated crossboundary judicial resistance to the forces of globalization. 17 Slaughter, supra note 9, at 12 (noting "the rising need for and capacity of different domestic
The Article begins with a theoretical explanation in Part II of the motivation behind this new judicial assertiveness. Part III provides the evidence of the phenomenon of inter-judicial cooperation, in three areas in which it can now be discerned: counterterrorism, the environment, and migration. Part IV discusses the potential, limits, and legitimacy of this evolving practice. Part V concludes.
II. The Impact of Globalization on National Decision-Making Processes
I begin here by revisiting the fundamental assumptions that led national courts in the past to defer to their governments against contemporary conditions. The traditional judicial policy of ensuring that the state speak "in one voice," that is, the voice of the government, rested on three premises. 18 First was that the murky world of diplomacy is detached from the domestic one, where the rule of law should prevail. The second assumption was that the government adequately represents the interests of its domestic constituency in its foreign diplomacy. The third premise was that the government can better conduct diplomatic affairs without the intervention of the judiciary. None of these assumptions can be claimed to be valid today. The spheres of global regulation increasingly affect the lives of potentially all citizens; governments are even more captured than ever by narrow domestic interests and, hence, unable to represent broad constituencies; and lastly, the contemporary world of diplomacy exposes governments to increasing pressure, where quite a few would actually benefit from domestic legal constraints that would tie their hands in the international bargaining process. National courts are left with only limited opportunities to restrain or at least slow down the drain of power from domestic institutions. Even more threatening to the courts are measures taken by governments -foreign governments as well as their own -that sap the courts of such opportunities and limit their independence. The newly evolving judicial approach may be interpreted, therefore, as government institutions to engage in activities beyond their borders, often with their foreign counterparts.") 18 Koh, supra note 3, at 2383-2394, distinguishes between three types of judicial concerns: separationof-powers concerns, judicial competence concerns, and comity concerns. aimed at facing up to globalization and revitalizing the authority of the national institutions.
In the following sections, I address the difficulties of the three basic assumptions of the judicial deference approach and then explain the underlying rationale of the contemporary approach.
(a) Three Contemporary Difficulties with the Traditional Deferential Approach
The first underlying premise of the judicial policy of deference was the disconnection between domestic politics and world politics. National courts were happy to allow their government complete leeway in international politics on the assumption that this sphere is essentially unrelated to the domestic legal system, at least directly. This assumption has lost its force over the years, in conjunction with the increasing permeability of the domestic legal system to external regulatory efforts. The formal delegation of authority to international institutions and the informal intergovernmental coordination render much of the domestic decision-making processes of most countries ineffectual. In many areas of regulation-encompassing not only economic activities but also matters of national security and, in recent years, the fight against global terrorism-at issue are no longer purely international affairs but matters that affect every individual. Many if not most economic matters are determined not by national legislatures but by foreign decision-makers, including powerful foreign governments, international institutions, and even private companies.
Coordinated counterterrorism policies cut deeply across the fabric of the domestic regulation of daily life. External measures determine people's levels of health and safety, influence their political freedoms and delineate their privacy, and in general shape their life opportunities. 19 The threat to the domestic democratic and legal processes has become tangible, and with this, a direct challenge to the very authority of the national court as the guardian of the basic rights of the citizen. Acquiescing to the executive's demand for judicial deference means completely abdicating this role.
But the challenge runs even deeper, for it is a challenge to the very idea of democracy. The ability of citizens to participate in decisions affecting them becomes merely formal as the domestic political branches fail to withstand the pressure brought to bear by domestic and foreign interest groups and foreign governments. In all but the strongest of nations, 20 the delegation of authority to international organizations threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the domestic systems of checks and balances.
The increasing vulnerability of the domestic legal system to external influence can be partly attributed to the burgeoning political power of certain interest groups who benefit from the reduced costs of investment across boundaries and of outsourcing. The influence of these groups on governments undermines the second assumption at the base of the deferential policy, that governments are the best representatives of national interests abroad. While this premise has always been (or should have been) somewhat suspect, in recent years more evidence has accumulated regarding small interest groups' exploitation of international politics to advance their narrow interests. 21 Using their economic leverage, they pressure their own governments or foreign governments to accept international agreements that are beneficial to them but detrimental to most other citizens of their countries. Moreover, the new modalities of global standard-setting by private actors have handed these groups direct authority to shape outcomes. 22 Thus, the assumption that the government knows best when it comes to foreign affairs and can be trusted to promote the entire nation's interests can no longer be compellingly asserted.
Finally, the third assumption, that international interaction should be free of legal restraints, has collapsed as well, in view of the increased "legalization of world politics" 23 and the dwindling bargaining power of many states. At least until the early 20 As Curtis Bradley observes, the three branches of the U.S. government have kept the domestic political and legal processes insulated from the direct influence of external policy and law-making through a variety of "non-self-execution filters. foreign citizens due to concerns regarding torture, or a country in which privacy rights are more strictly upheld, could become (or could be seen as having the potential to become) a haven for terrorists if other countries are less tolerant to migrants or have laxer privacy rights. Another factor is the international pressure that could be brought to bear on a government to circumvent its court's decisions, or force it into compliance, or else risk the loss of peer protection for failing to comply with the group's demands. The optimal response to all these possibilities is coordination amongst national courts. A transnational united front amongst the highest domestic courts would ensure that no country will become the dumping ground for imported waste or a terrorist haven or face collective sanctions and that less peer pressure will be exerted on governments to ignore their courts' judgments.
While this is a theoretical model that suggests that judges would be behaving consistently with it even if they may not in fact be consciously following the logic of it, one finds several judicial remarks indicating that national courts are acutely aware http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/art59
of the need for a coordinated stance. 30 Even the courts of the most powerful nations are concerned that "unilateral action by the courts of one nation" 31 would not produce the desired outcomes. The House of Lords, for example, has stated that "international treaties should, so far as possible, be construed uniformly by the national courts of all states" 32 and has even recently asserted that "it is not for a national court to 'develop' international law by unilaterally adopting a version of that law which, however desirable, forward-looking and reflective of values it may be, is simply not accepted by other states." 33 In the context of coordinating migration policies, which is explored below, 34 judges from several countries went beyond statements and established an institution to ensure uniformity. Courts need assurances that courts in other jurisdictions will enforce similar rules.
Establishing a higher court to whose decisions national courts must adhere, such as the European Court of Justice, is surely one effective avenue for forging common judicial ground 35 (or, in more sinister scenarios, a means to curtail national courts' authority). But this is not a prerequisite for transnational judicial coordination.
Cooperation can evolve endogenously also amongst courts, even when they seek to promote national interests rather than global justice. Game theory demonstrates that indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma games between two players are likely to induce cooperation, even absent external intervention. If the number of iterations is indefinite and the "shadow of the future" high enough (namely, the players assign a sufficiently high value to the expected payoffs from future iterations of the game), then each player is expected to choose the strategy of conditional cooperation in a "friendly tit for tat." Using the implicit threat of retaliation against defection, the players can elicit cooperation. The same tit-for-tat strategy will produce cooperation 30 The lack of certainty regarding any such coordination lay at the basis of their earlier policy of deferment, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 31 Note the quote from the Alvarez-Machain judgment, supra note 18, about the "advantage of the diplomatic approach … as opposed to the unilateral action by the courts of one nation" (emphasis added also in a game played by a group larger than two players and even when some of the players choose to defect unconditionally. Such situations, which are the least likely to generate cooperation when played only once, are in fact potentially cooperative games when the players remain in the game for an indefinite period of time.
Hence, for courts to bolster their governments by restraining them and asserting their own authority, they must initiate cooperation with similarly situated courts. The only effective way for courts in developing countries to put a stop to the intensifying levels of pollution, environmental degradation, and imported waste is to take a united stand against external interests shopping for less restrictive jurisdictions.
Courts that wish to maintain a higher level of human rights protection within their jurisdiction but without turning into a terrorist haven or target, or without diverting the world's asylum seekers to their shores, should also strive to forge a united front with their counterparts in other countries. In other words, inter-judicial cooperation can be a strategic choice for national courts determined to protect their own authority and to reclaim domestic democratic processes.
The optimal way for courts to initiate and maintain cooperation is through 
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Courts that wish to signal readiness to cooperate will tend to use the language other courts understand: comparative law (primarily comparative constitutional law) and international law. 39 The use of comparative analysis is a signal that courts are willing to learn from one another, or are seeking support from other jurisdictions for their judgments, or both. More significantly, they learn from each other's legal systems how to balance amongst the competing common interests and how to manage the conflicting common risks to their societies. Part argues that this phenomenon is discernible so far at least in three areas: the judicial review of global counterterrorism measures, the protection of the environment in developing countries, and the status of asylum seekers in destination countries. These are three areas where courts apparently reacted to what they regarded as either too weak governmental responses to external pressures (in the contexts of counterterrorism and the environment) or too strong a response (against asylum seekers). This Part examines the evolution of judicial cooperation as the courts seek to balance out their governments in these three areas. The limited space cannot but offer a broad and sketchy outline of the emerging jurisprudence. The aim, of course, is to demonstrate the probability of the thesis, rather than to provide indepth analysis of the specific areas. Therefore the focus here will be more on the means of communications -the increased use of comparative constitutional, and the creative use of international law -rather than on the specific content of the norms.
Further and more in-depth research is necessary to explore more deeply these and possibly other areas of judicial cooperation.
(a) Reviewing Global Counterterrorism Measures
More than six years into the coordinated global effort against Al-Qaeda and its associated groups, it has become increasingly clear that the persistent attempts by the executive and legislative branches of a number of democracies to curtail judicial review of counterterrorism policies have, by and large, failed. These governments have not succeeded at convincing their courts to defer judgment and, in fact, have generated a counter-reaction on the part of the judiciary. Hesitant at first, the courts regained their confidence and are asserting novel claims that bolster their judicial authority.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, national courts faced a major challenge to their authority. Alarmed over the potentially devastating effects of 47 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
global terrorism, national governments sought to intensify restrictions on rights and liberties perceived as facilitating terrorist acts or impeding counterterrorism measures.
They insisted on broad, exclusive discretion in shaping and implementing these constraints as they see fit, based on the claim that the executive holds a relative advantage over the other branches of government in assessing the risks of terrorism and in managing those risks. The post-9/11 global counterterrorism effort effectively united national security agencies in a concerted effort towards a common cause. They claims to absolute discretion in acting to guarantee national security swept the courts as well. In fact, conformity of this nature in times of war and national crisis has 48 The main UN body set up to curb terrorism is the Counter-Terrorism Committee ("CTC" Whereas the U.S. Congress was not deterred to inflict "a stinging rebuke to the Supreme Court," 81 by stripping the courts from habeas corpus jurisdiction with respect to non-U.S. citizens determined by the executive to be enemy combatants, 82 and immunizing the executive from judicial review based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 83 other executive bodies and legislatures have demonstrated stronger commitment to international standards as interpreted by their courts, despite the fact that they could, if they wanted to, have the last word.
(b) Environment Protection in Developing Countries
It is not necessary to travel to India or Pakistan to realize the extent to which their environments are at risk. Indeed, it is sufficient to read the many court decisions rendered in those countries to get a sense of the health threats to the citizens due to environmental degradation. The courts in several developing countries 85 This may also explain why courts in developed countries continued to defer to the domestic political process in the environmental context and refrain from implementing international standards. 90 Indeed, the activist Indian Court declined to intervene in a petition against the damming the Narmada River in view of the robust decision-making processes that led to the decision to dam the river.
91
In the absence of specific domestic legislation, courts in environmentally Clearly, these courts are fully aware of the potentially adverse economic implications of their pro-environment jurisprudence. 109 Inter-judicial cooperation must therefore be seen as a way to mitigate those adverse consequences. In fact, given the grave environmental threat hovering over the Indian subcontinent, these national courts may have just as doggedly pushed for reform even without backing from their counterparts in neighboring nations. But absent such cooperation, they might have been much less resistant to pressure brought to bear by domestic and foreign industry groups for whom lower environmental standards mean greater economic gain. These courts are not all-powerful in their quest to restrain the economic forces of globalization.
(c) Coordinating the Migration into Destination Countries
Waves of asylum seekers from strife and poverty stricken regions, especially since the early 1990s, have prompted developed countries to modify their migration policies by restricting considerably the access of refugees and limiting their rights.
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after negotiations between the developed and the developing countries that an almost consensus declaration had been sorted out. Environment is an international problem having no frontiers creating transboundary effects. In this field every nation has to cooperate and contribute and for this reason the Rio Declaration would serve as a great binding force and to create discipline among the nations while dealing with environmental problems. Coming back to the present subject, it would not be out of place to mention that Principle No. 15 envisages rule of precaution and prudence. 106 Bulankulama v. Ministry of Indus. Dev., supra note 94 (referring to the international declarations as "International standard setting instruments"). Inter-judicial cooperation is necessary in this area in order to stand up to the domestic political process without incurring the "costs" of increasing the numbers of refugees. The stakes, however, were high, and it was ineffective, even irresponsible, (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough):"The scheme of the Geneva Convention is that any such differences should be referred to and resolved by the International Court of Justice under art 38 of that convention. However there is no prospect that the presently relevant difference (which has existed now for many years) will be resolved in that way. So long as such differences continue to exist, the intention of the Geneva Convention to provide a uniformity of approach to the refugee problem will be frustrated and the scheme of the international response will remain grossly distorted. Algeria to Germany and France respectively, due to the concern that they might be deported and face persecution. seekers who fled non-state persecution. However, it did not refer to international law in its interpretation of the relevant provisions in the German law.
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The coalition of courts determined to develop a consistent interpretation of the 1951 Convention, and the opposition of those courts who insisted on a different outcome, are two sides of the same coin, the coin being the use of international law as a strategic tool by national courts. For courts that seek to establish a common front, a shared text is an asset they cultivate. At the same time, however, this story suggests that international law may be important also for the courts that seek to protect their domestic political process from external pressures. The German Federal
Administrative Court offers an example of a court that uses the language of international law to explain why the common standard should not apply in Germany.
Note that a common judicial front may not always be beneficial to asylum seekers. As Gerald Neuman noted, a common position privileges the status quo, since changes require consensus and careful coordination, and asylum seekers could benefit from divergence between national policies defining their status and rights. 141 But in the trade-off between the common position of the governments and that of the courts, the latter has so far proved more beneficial for the refugees.
(d) The Potential and Limits to further Cooperation
The picture that emerges from reviewing the way courts employ foreign and international law is complex, but it indicates that foreign and international law have become effective tools for inter-judicial coordination, and that courts tend to resort to such tools either to protect the independence of the domestic political branches from external pressures or protect their own independence (from encroachment by their 149 Reading these cases reminds one of the jurisprudence of their government's position. 150 Indeed these decisions are standing proof that interjudicial cooperation is a strategy of choice, pursued purely for parochial ends. And when these ends change, we can expect the cooperation to end with them.
IV. The Emergence of Transnational Checks and Balances

(a) Realignment of Existing Systems of Checks and Balances
As suggested above, there are areas of regulation where courts no longer agree to defer to their governments. These courts give new and quite revolutionary meaning to the call to "speak in one voice": this time, these are the different national courts that seek to form one voice vis-à-vis their respective political branches. The courts may wish to achieve a number of goals. In the counterterrorism sphere, courts have been aware to the external pressures on their governments that had effectively silenced the Operating through the Counter-Terrorism Committee, under the aegis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, governments limited judicial review by their national courts. 152 In the sphere of migration there is clear evidence of European governments preempting their courts by resorting to the apparatus of the European Union to regulate migration policies. 153 The fragmentation of international law and the move to informal regulatory mechanisms 154 may render the task of inter-judicial coordination more difficult. Another inter-governmental measure to preempt national courts is to provide competing judicial venues through adjudicative bodies in international organizations. 155 Perhaps counterintuitively, it should be noted that at least for the governments of stronger nations, international courts can be expected to be more acquiescent than their national courts are. 156 Such governments control nominations and budgets to international tribunals, and they also retain the ability to exit institutions they do not like if they are unhappy with the outcomes. 157 Moreover, national courts in most democracies enjoy greater domestic legitimacy than do international tribunals. Their basic source of authority -the national constitutionsare usually immune to law made by colluding governments. Indeed, both in the sphere of counterterrorism 158 and in that of migration, 159 national courts have made more strident steps to restrain governments than international tribunals have.
Thus we are witnessing the emergence of transnational checks and balances.
As the state "disaggregates," 160 the traditional maps of domestic checks and balances are also redrawn in the never-ending struggle to govern and to review government. In an era of inter-dependency, both the national government and the national court must Is it legitimate for national courts to reach out beyond their respective jurisdictions and forge collective policies that diverge from their governments' positions? Is it legitimate for them to rely on international law and comparative constitutional law, rather than using the norms promulgated by the domestic democratically elected bodies? Critics have thus far addressed the second, the more apparent, question.
Foreign law, the familiar argument goes, has little role to play in a sovereign democracy. It is easy to imagine the criticism of the more recent and less apparent practice of using foreign law to form inter-judicial coalitions: the courts are overstepping their authority by their preemption of their respective political branches.
These arguments build upon the theme of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," the "obsession" or "fixation" 165 mainly of U.S. constitutional theory since Alexander
Bickel's The Last Dangerous Branch. 166 Evidence of inter-judicial cabals aimed at limiting the discretion of governments -as exemplified in the migration contextseems to add to this apprehension.
The analysis in this Article, however, suggests that the concern over the "countermajoritarian difficulty" is unwarranted at least in those spheres of judicial action that is aimed at strengthening domestic democratic deliberations. over the extent to which courts can legitimately get involved in the business of the political branches, especially in the context of legislation review, has proceeded based on the assumption that the polity is sovereign to make up its mind according to its citizens' wishes. Citizens could shape their lives through participation in the political process. But in an era of global interdependency, polities often lose this ability, and external actors seize the opportunity to shape outcomes the way they deem fit. With the possible exception of the U.S., most nations have yielded significant parts of their policy-making to external forces. Foreign governments and private actors increasingly leave national governments and legislatures little choice but to defer to their demands.
The responses of governments and legislatures to the post-9/11 counterterrorism measures and the inaction of governments of developing countries to protect the environment, as described above, exemplify this predicament. National courts-again, with the exception of the U.S. courts, which, for obvious reasons do not share these concerns-react to what they identify as weakness on the part of the political branches to withstand pressure, especially from external sources, to comply with standards imposed by strong global powers or by the market forces. To the extent that courts are in fact doing their utmost to resuscitate this process, resorting to foreign and international law to resurrect domestic democracy, the Bickelian type of criticism is simply misguided. By seeking to coordinate their stances, national courts are not motivated by utopian globalism, but, rather, quite to the contrary: their coordination efforts are aimed at promoting domestic interests and concerns. This role is thoroughly justified in democratic terms.
Inter-judicial coordination can potentially contribute to the strengthening of democratic decision-making within international institutions. The available checks and balances to ensure the accountability of such institutions -that include selfregulation and "peer review" opportunities -leave much to be desired. 167 A coalition of national courts, less dependent on governments than many of the current alternatives, may prove a welcome addition to a robust global system of checks and balances and nurture transnational deliberations. The are obviously concerns with this inter-judicial collective selfempowerment: courts are ultimately also delegated institutions; they may suffer from class, gender and ethnicity biases; they do not have the expertise necessary to assess and manage risks; their intervention could burden global governance. These concerns, well-known in the debate about the legitimacy of domestic judicial review, are equally valid in the context of transnational review. Courts are aware of these concerns and at times exhibit self-restraints. As the discussion on the migration policies demonstrated, the French and German courts took seriously the public debate within their polities and "defected" from the judicial coalition over refugee status.
Obviously, judicial self-restraint is not always effective, and excesses can be expected. Overall, however, it cannot be denied that national courts bring to the emerging global deliberation process a voice that may not be adequately heard but for their insistence.
V. Conclusion
This Article has argued that the aspiration to "speak in one voice" is shared by a growing number of national courts across the globe. But as opposed to what prevailed only a decade ago, it is no longer the wish of these courts to speak in the voice of their governments, but rather to align their jurisprudence with other national courts.
Comparative constitutional law and international law have proven to be the best tools for effectuating this strategy. The Article explains this strategy as a reaction to the delegation of governmental authority to formal or informal international institutions and to the mounting economic pressures on governments and courts to conform to global standards. The judicial reaction, in turn, can expand the space of domestic deliberation and bolster the national governments' ability to withstand pressure brought to bear by interest groups and powerful foreign governments. Such motivation for trans-jurisdiction coordination is fully justified under democratic theories that conceive of the court as a facilitator of democratic deliberation.
As discussed, the coordination strategy is limited to situations in which courts observe that their government, their legislature, or they themselves have succumbed to or are threatened by economic or political powers that stifle the democratic process through coordinated supranational standards, be they formal (in treaties) or informal.
This suggests that courts might not be equally adamant when there are only local dimensions to a given dispute, as, for example, would be the case in disputes over conditions for detaining local criminals or the displacement of indigenous inhabitants due to dam construction.
It is too early to assess the success of this emerging trend. Every collective action depends on a sufficient number of contributors to the effort. Changes in the domestic rules protecting judicial independence could put a damper on the willingness of the courts in the relevant countries to take on an assertive role. Governments may be pressured also to submit to intergovernmental efforts seeking to deprive courts of the authority or opportunity to act. But following the analysis in this Article, it seems safe to assume that courts will not sit idly by while their authority to review the actions of the political branches erodes away. In an era when governments are opting for alternatives to formal internal or international lawmaking, it is the national courts that are turning very seriously to comparative constitutional law and to international law.
This is a surprising mirror image of the state of affairs that existed only a decade ago.
